General Sir Hubert de la Poer Gough ( GOF; 12 August 1870 – 18 March 1963) was a senior officer in the British Army in the First World War. A controversial figure, he was a favourite of the commander-in-chief of the British Expeditionary Force on the Western Front, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, and the youngest of Haig's field army commanders. Gough was educated at Eton and the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, before commissioning into the 16th Lancers in 1889. His early career included notable service in the Second Boer War, and a more controversial role in the Curragh incident, in which he was one of the leading officers who threatened to accept dismissal rather than deploy into Protestant Ulster. Gough experienced a meteoric rise during the First World War, from command of a cavalry brigade in August 1914, to division command at the First Battle of Ypres that autumn, to a corps at the Battle of Loos a year later. From mid-1916 he commanded the Reserve Army (later renamed the Fifth Army) during the Battle of the Somme in 1916 and the Battle of Passchendaele in 1917. His tenure was marked by controversy around his leadership style, his perceived reputation as "a thruster", and the efficiency of the organisation of his army, especially relative to the reputation for caution and efficiency of General Sir Herbert Plumer's Second Army. Fifth Army bore the initial brunt of the German spring offensive in March 1918, but Gough was scapegoated and relieved of his command. After the war, he briefly held a command in the Baltic until retirement in 1922, and stood unsuccessfully for Parliament. After a brief spell at farming, he made a new career for himself as a company director. Gough gradually re-emerged as an influential figure in military circles and public life, writing two volumes of memoirs. He was a senior commander in the London Home Guard in the Second World War and lived long enough to be interviewed on television in the early 1960s. Historians continue to study Gough's career as a case study of how the BEF coped with rapid expansion, with officers commanding forces far larger than during their peacetime experience, of the degree of initiative which should be granted to subordinates, and of the evolution of operational planning under stalemate conditions, from an initial emphasis on achieving breakthrough (with attrition regarded as preliminary "wearing out") to a stress on cautious advances under cover of massive, concentrated artillery fire.
Early life
Gough was born in London on 12 August 1870. He was born into an Anglo-Irish military family, the eldest son of General Charles John Stanley Gough As an infant, Gough went to India with his family late in 1870, but Gough and his brother Johnny were sent to a boarding school in England, and Gough did not meet his father, who was on active service in the Second Afghan War, again until he was sixteen.
Early career
Gough was educated at Eton College then at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. He was gazetted into the 16th Lancers as a second lieutenant on 5 March 1889. He distinguished himself as a rider, winning the Regimental Cup, and as a polo player with many of his horses provided for him by wealthier officers. Gough was promoted to lieutenant on 23 July 1890, and set out for India that autumn. He was promoted captain on 22 December 1894 at the relatively early age of 24. He served with the Tirah Field Force 1897–98 and on the Northwest Frontier. Gough returned to England in June 1898, and sat the examination for entrance to the Staff College, Camberley. He married Margaret Louisa Nora Lewes (known as "Daisy") on 22 December 1898.
== Boer War == Gough started at Staff College, Camberley, on 9 January 1899 but did not complete the course. Instead he was ordered on special service to South Africa on 25 October 1899, reaching Cape Town on 15 November. He was deployed to Natal as instructor to one of the Rifle Associations (locally raised units of volunteer mounted infantry or light cavalry). Gough then served as ADC to Douglas Cochrane, 12th Earl of Dundonald, who was commanding mounted troops in Natal. In January 1900 he was promoted to brigade intelligence officer, a role which required a great deal of scouting.
On 1 February Gough was appointed, as a local unpaid major, CO of a Composite Regiment (a squadron of Imperial Light Horse, a squadron of Natal Carbineers and a company of 60th Rifles Mounted Infantry). He led his regiment to assist Buller's third attempt (5–7 February) to cross the Tugela River, and in the fourth attempt (14–27 February). He defied written orders from Dundonald to lead the first British troops into Ladysmith (28 February), meeting his brother Johnnie who had been besieged inside the town. His meeting with George Stuart White was widely portrayed. During the ensuing period of guerrilla warfare, Gough's Regiment was reinforced to a strength of 600 men. Along with Horace Smith-Dorrien and Edmund Allenby, he served under the overall command of Lieutenant-General John French. On 17 September 1901, after poor reconnaissance, he attacked near Blood River Poort, but was taken prisoner with his entire force by larger Boer forces which had been out of sight. He later escaped. Gough was invalided home with a wounded right hand in January 1902,
== Edwardian era == Gough returned as a Regular Army captain in the 16th Lancers on 23 August 1902, but the following month was appointed brigade major of the 1st Cavalry Brigade at Aldershot on 24 September 1902 with promotion to the substantive rank of major on 22 October 1902. His brevet rank of lieutenant colonel took effect the following day (23 October 1902). Gough was appointed an instructor at the Staff College on 1 January 1904 and served there until 1906 under Colonel Sir Henry Rawlinson as the college's commandant. Gough was the first instructor to win the college point-to-point. Gough was promoted brevet colonel on 11 June 1906 and substantive lieutenant colonel on 18 July 1906, continuing to serve at the Staff College. He was appointed commanding officer (CO) of the 16th (Queen's) Lancers on 15 December 1907. He was still the youngest lieutenant colonel in the army. After a fortnight on half-pay from 19 December 1910, Gough was promoted temporary brigadier general and appointed general officer commanding (GOC) of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade at the Curragh (1 January 1911). In June 1912 he was created a CB in the 1912 Birthday Honours.
== Curragh incident == With Irish Home Rule due to become law in 1914, the Cabinet were contemplating some form of military action against the Ulster Volunteers who wanted no part of it. Gough was one of the leading officers who threatened to accept dismissal in the ensuing Curragh incident. On the morning of Friday 20 March, Arthur Paget (Commander-in-Chief, Ireland) addressed senior officers at his headquarters in Dublin. By Gough's account (in his memoirs Soldiering On), he said that "active operations were to commence against Ulster", that officers who lived in Ulster would be permitted to "disappear" for the duration, but that other officers who refused to serve against Ulster would be dismissed rather than being permitted to resign, and that Gough – who had a family connection with Ulster but did not live there – could expect no mercy from his "old friend at the War Office" (Sir John French). French, Paget and Spencer Ewart had in fact (on 19 March) agreed to exclude officers with "direct family connections" to Ulster. In making an ultimatum, Paget was acting foolishly, as most might have obeyed a direct order. Paget ended the meeting by ordering his officers to speak to their subordinates and then report back. Gough also sent a telegram to his brother Johnnie, Douglas Haig's Chief of Staff at Aldershot. Gough did not attend the second meeting in the afternoon, at which Paget stated that the purpose of the move was to overawe Ulster rather than fight. That evening Paget informed the War Office by telegram that 57 officers preferred to accept dismissal (it was actually 61 including Gough). Gough was suspended from duty and he and two of his three colonels were summoned to the War Office to explain themselves.
=== "The peccant paragraphs" === Gough sent a telegram to the elderly Field-Marshal Lord Roberts (who had been lobbying the King and arguing with John French (Chief of the Imperial General Staff) on the telephone), purporting to ask for advice, although possibly to goad him into further action. After being reassured by Roberts that the deployment into Ulster was purely precautionary, he confirmed to Spencer Ewart (on the morning of Sunday 22 March) that he would have obeyed a direct order. In another meeting at the War Office (23 March), Gough, (possibly influenced by Major-General Henry Hughes Wilson), demanded a written guarantee from French and Ewart that the Army would not be used against Ulster. At another meeting Secretary of State for War John Seely accepted French's suggestion that a written document from the Army Council might help to convince Gough's officers. The Cabinet approved a text, stating that the Army Council were satisfied that the incident had been a misunderstanding, and that it was "the duty of all soldiers to obey lawful commands", to which Seely added two paragraphs, stating that the Government had the right to use the "forces of the Crown" in Ireland or elsewhere, but had no intention of using force "to crush opposition to the Home Rule Bill". At another meeting after 4 pm Gough, on the advice of Henry Wilson (also present), demanded a further paragraph stating that the Army would not be used to enforce Home Rule on Ulster, with which French concurred in writing. When H. H. Asquith (Prime Minister) learned of this he demanded that Gough return the document, which he refused to do. Asquith publicly repudiated the "peccant paragraphs" (25 March). French and Seely both had to resign.
First World War
Early war
Cavalry brigade: Mons to the Marne
At the outbreak of war in August 1914, Gough took the 3rd Cavalry Brigade to France, under the command of Allenby (GOC Cavalry Division). On 22 August one of Gough's artillery batteries was the first British battery to open fire on the Germans. The brigade fought at the Battle of Mons (23 August). During the following days Gough detached himself from Allenby's command and linked up with Haig's I Corps on the BEF right. Allenby publicly laughed this off as "only Gough's little way" but was privately furious at French (Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF)) and Haig's tolerance of Gough's behaviour; relations between Allenby and Gough were strained thereafter. The brigade fought at the Battle of Le Cateau (26 August). By 1 September they were at Villers-Cotterêts, south of the Aisne, after a retreat of 180 miles (100 miles as the crow flies), assisting a rearguard of Irish Guards (part of I Corps) in the last major action of the retreat. On 5 September Gough linked up for the first time with British transport and supplies.
Cavalry division
By the time of the Battle of the Marne 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades had been formed into "Gough's Command", an ad hoc cavalry force separate from Allenby's Cavalry Division. On 15 September Gough's Command, with the addition of supporting troops, was formed into 2nd Cavalry Division and he was appointed the division's GOC on 16 September. The two cavalry divisions were formed into a Cavalry Corps under Allenby (9 September), and reached the Belgian border by train on 11 September. The 2nd Cavalry Division was on the western flank of the BEF, and tried to turn the German west flank, but was ordered to halt by Allenby. On 14 October Gough linked up with the IV Corps, under Lieutenant General Sir Henry Rawlinson, moving down from the coast, removing the danger of being cut off. Gough advanced again but met new German forces trying to turn the British flank; on 16 and 17 October the Germans held the river Lys against Gough. Entrenchment began on 20 October. Gough's division, sometimes with as few as 2,000 men in the front line, was defending around Messines and Wytschaete. Gough was promoted major-general on 26 October backdated to 15 September. From 30 October to the night of 31 October – 1 November Gough's small division, assisted by Indian and London Scottish Territorial troops, held Messines-Wytschaete Ridge against a strong attack from the south-east by Max von Fabeck.
Gough's division returned to the front at Hooge, near Ypres, on 12 February 1915. On 13 February he was offered a command in the planned Salonika expedition (in the event these troops were sent to Gallipoli) but declined after consulting his brother and BEF Chief of Staff "Wully" Robertson. Johnnie Gough died of wounds later in February. Haig, a shy man, liked Gough for his wit and open personality, and to some extent he replaced his brother as Haig's confidant. Haig asked for Gough to be attached to his forces in case he "br[oke] the enemy line" at Neuve Chapelle (10–13 March); Gough's division was in GHQ Reserve for that battle.
Infantry division
Gough was appointed GOC of 7th Division on 18 April 1915, part of Rawlinson's IV Corps, itself part of Haig's First Army; Gough may have been appointed as a counterbalance to Rawlinson, with whom Haig had a wary relationship. 7th division was in reserve at Second Ypres (22 April). Gough commanded 7th Division at the Battle of Aubers Ridge in May. It was in corps reserve on 9 May, and that night was ordered to relieve 8th Division in the line, ready to attack the next day. After protests from the brigadiers that the support trenches were full of men – alive, wounded and dead – Gough cancelled the relief on his own authority. He expected to be disciplined by Rawlinson, but instead his division was redeployed to the sector of Charles Monro's I Corps, where diversionary attacks were to be mounted to assist the French. Monro gave Gough and his artillery officer "Curly" Birch great freedom. They bombarded for a few minutes, leaving a gap to tempt the Germans out of their shelters (repeated several times in preceding days), bringing some guns forward on muffled wheels for surprise. The assault began at 3:15 am on 16 May; the right of 7th Division was the only part of I Corps attack to succeed. The next day Gough made little further progress despite help from almost every First Army gun in range.
Corps commander: Loos
==== Planning ==== Gough was appointed GOC I Corps, still part of Haig's First Army, and promoted temporary lieutenant-general on 13 July 1915. During the upcoming Battle of Loos Haig (13 August) had asked Gough to plan to take the Hohenzollern Redoubt (roughly north-east), while Rawlinson's IV Corps was to take Loos and possibly Hill 70 (roughly south-east) to open a gap for the reserves to push due east to take Hulluch. Gough (22 August) proposed that 9th (Scottish) Division should "rush" the German positions on his left (Hohenzollern Redoubt, Fosse 8) just before dawn (4 am) after a barrage and gas attack, while the following night 7th Division would push through the Quarries to Citie St Elie.
==== Gough's attacks ==== On 25 September chlorine gas was released to assist the British attack, despite unfavourable wind likely to blow it back over British troops. Although Captain Ernest Gold (meteorological officer) and Maj-Gen Henry Horne (GOC 2nd Division) were later blamed, Charles Foulkes (the gas officer) later hinted that "still higher authority" may have been responsible, and a gas officer Lt Sewill recorded being told that the order came from Gough. At 5:20 am Gough had advised Haig that it was too late to cancel the gas release. However, Nick Lloyd argues that the fault lay with Haig for agreeing to the plan. On Gough's left 2nd Division met heavy losses. On Gough's right 7th Division captured the enemy first line with heavy loss. Gough was away from his HQ for two hours trying to discover why 28 Brigade (in his centre) were not making progress. Major-General George Thesiger, GOC 9th (Scottish) Division, "dissociated" himself from Gough's orders to attack again at noon. Orders reached the two forward battalions just before noon; they attacked hastily at heavy loss. The divisional history (1921) was scathing about this episode, of which Gough's memoirs later made little mention. Nick Lloyd argues that Gough displayed the impatient aggression for which he was later to become notorious. Between 27 September and 5 October Gough ordered 28th Division to retake Fosse 8, taken briefly by the British on 26 September. The division commander Maj-Gen Edward Bulfin and his subordinate Brig-Gen Cecil Pereira (85 Brigade) later recalled Gough constantly ordering attacks without proper artillery support. 28th Division fought hard in wet weather, winning two Victoria Crosses, but were much criticised by Haig and Gough, who issued them a stinging twelve point rebuke on 6 October. Gough later recorded in his memoirs that he himself had been under great pressure from Haig to attack and make progress.
==== Ousting of Sir John French ==== Gough began a corps-level inquiry into the lessons of the battle (10 October), which was followed by a First Army inquiry (20 October). Gough's inquiry found that attacks had been stymied by lack of grenades, but had come close to a breakthrough where the wind had carried British gas over the German lines. Gough was one of the senior officers who criticised French's command of the BEF to Lord Haldane (9 October 1915) and King George V (24 October 1915). Haig succeeded French, who was forced to "resign" as C-in-C.
==== Military ideas ==== Gough later commented on the draft of the Official History (1926) that a limited attack at Loos would have been more sensible, as it could have been reinforced if Joseph Joffre's offensive succeeded, and was critical of Haig for – as so often – attempting to achieve decisive victory with insufficient means. Notes from a conference held by Gough on 20 December 1915 show that he still thought in terms of the principles of warfare as taught at Staff College: he still expected an "advance guard" to move forward until, after two or three days, a plan had been decided on for deploying the bulk of British forces, whereas in reality, by 1917, the opening day would often prove the most effective. Like many British generals, he blamed the failures of 1915 on human error in applying the principles of warfare, rather than on the need to concentrate artillery, learn new tactics, and allow senior officers to gain experience.
The Somme 1916
Initial phases
===== Training cavalry and plans for exploitation ===== Haig told Gough, who in January 1916 was made KCB, to be prepared to take I Corps up to Flanders. Haig had not completely abandoned his hopes of a Flanders offensive at least as late as June. Gough was appointed GOC Reserve Corps, which was to exploit any breakthrough achieved at the Somme, on 4 April 1916. Gough spent most of the next two months supervising the training of the cavalry divisions. Gough's staff had to liaise with XIII and XV Corps (on the right of General Sir Henry Rawlinson's Fourth Army) to draw up contingency plans in case "things went as we hoped for" and with Lieutenant General Claud Jacob, whose II Corps was also earmarked for the exploitation. By mid-June Gough was also training the 1st Indian Cavalry Division and 2nd Indian Cavalry Division. In May, after discussions with Rawlinson, Gough proposed to use a cavalry brigade in the north (the Ancre Valley) and another in the south (Montauban), to assist if the Germans collapsed. Haig, thinking the ground unsuitable, vetoed his suggestion that a further entire cavalry division should be used in the north to help roll up the enemy second line. Reserve Corps was renamed Reserve Army on 22 May 1916, In late June, despite the Battle of Verdun reducing the planned French contribution from 39 divisions to twelve, Haig's plans became more aggressive. Instead of exploiting southeast to cover the flank of a French crossing of the Somme, Haig (memo to Rawlinson 16 June, Haig diary 21 June) now wrote that once Pozières Ridge was taken Gough was to exploit northeast to Bapaume and then once reinforced turn north to Monchy to take the German Arras positions in "flank and reverse". Haig told Gough (diary 27 June) he was "too inclined to aim at fighting a battle at Bapaume" but should instead aim to push on, before the Germans had a chance to attack him from the north. Haig would have preferred Gough to take command of the two left hand corps (VIII Corps and X Corps) prior to the attack but instead, that evening, approved Rawlinson's plan for Gough to set up HQ at Albert as soon as the Pozières Heights had fallen. By now Reserve Army had three infantry and three cavalry divisions. Research by Stephen Badsey among the surviving evidence suggests that the final plan was for Gough to exploit any breakthrough with the 25th Division, followed by two of the three cavalry divisions, then the II Corps (three divisions).
Battle of Albert
In the afternoon of 1 July Haig, not yet aware of how badly the northern attack had gone, visited Gough and ordered him to "move up" in the evening. Gough visited Rawlinson in the afternoon (the third time that day) but was told that there would be no breakthrough that day, so he ordered cavalry to return to billets. At 7 pm Rawlinson put Gough in command of X and VIII Corps (the northern sector of the Somme front), with orders to "push them on again". Taking command on 2 July, Gough reported that VIII Corps communication trenches were blocked with dead and wounded troops and X Corps was found to be little better. In the early hours of 3 July, Rawlinson ordered Gough to renew the attack, orders which Haig then countermanded. Gough was ordered to attack towards Schwaben Redoubt to rescue British survivors of 1 July. Despite Haig and Rawlinson's preference for minor attacks, they allowed Gough to attack a salient south-east of Thiepval, with six battalions. Sheffield wrote that the attack was "a complete shambles", but Gough was not entirely to blame and that it typified the "chaos" of British operations at that stage. Gough later claimed to have regretted the attack. In the afternoon of 3 July, Reserve Army was formally made independent of Fourth Army. Over the following months most of the shells and heavy artillery would be supporting Rawlinson's efforts, and although Gough was given extra guns later, he never had as many as Fourth Army. Haig's orders were to "sap" with small penetrations to open up he German lines to flanking attacks. Kiggell (BEF Chief of Staff) wrote Gough a memo (4 July) that his role was to assist Rawlinson by pinning down German reserves and that he was to keep within his allotted quantity of shells. In July Gough believed that frequent small narrow-front attacks would keep the Germans "off balance" with low British casualties, but they allowed the Germans to concentrate their fire, contributing to the massive British losses of that month. Gough was promoted to temporary general on 7 July 1916, aged just 45. The Reserve Army took Ovillers on 16 July.
Summer
Pozières
The slaughter of 1 July had shown that the German positions on VIII Corps sector and much of X Corps sector were too strong to attack frontally. Until early September Gough attacked with two divisions of X Corps, later assisted by the newly arrived II Corps to assist Rawlinson's left flank, but on only two occasions before 3 September, were efforts coordinated with Fourth Army and one of those (22/23 July) by accident. On 15 July, the day after Fourth Army's success at the Battle of Bazentin Ridge, Haig envisaged Gough exploiting up the Ancre valley, to attack the enemy on Third Army's front (to Gough's north) from the south. The Pozières sector was handed over from Rawlinson to Gough on 15 July, making the Albert–Bapaume Road the boundary between the two armies. When Fourth Army's attacks again ran out of steam, Haig ordered Gough (18 July) to prepare for "methodical operations against Pozières ... with as little delay as possible", to capture the summit of Thiepval Ridge. Haig sent some fresh divisions to X Corps and also deployed I ANZAC Corps, newly arrived on the Western Front, opposite Pozières. This was the most important attack yet expected of Gough. On 18 July Maj-Gen Harold "Hooky" Walker, the British officer commanding 1st Australian Division, was ordered to attack Pozières the following night. Walker recorded his horror in his diary. I ANZAC Corps HQ had not yet arrived on the Somme and Walker and his chief of staff Brudenell White argued until Gough gave in. Walker later wrote that he had to demand extra artillery, and only obtained permission to attack from the south east rather than the south west (the direction of previous unsuccessful attacks) as Gough wanted after taking Edward "Moses" Beddington, a staff officer whom Gough trusted, with him to reconnoitre the position. Gough defended the ANZACs to Haig against "tittle-tattle" at GHQ by officers who had "no idea of the real worth of the Australians". Gough later claimed (letter to Edmonds in 1939) he had given Walker no choice but had himself ordered the change in the direction of the attack. The attack was delayed until 12:30 am on the night of 22/23 July and Pozières was taken, partly as a result of planning and partly as tired German troops were being relieved by fresh troops. The fall of Pozières on 22/23 July was the most successful part of a Big Push involving eight divisions, spread across five corps, from Pozières on the left to Guillemont on Rawlinson's right.
===== Clashes with subordinates ===== Gough used his corps as "postboxes", whereas Rawlinson was more tolerant of debate and discussion. Gough was reluctant to allow corps their normal role of control of artillery (which he centralised at Army level under Brigadier-General Tancred) and in planning operations. Neill Malcolm (Chief of Staff Reserve Army) recorded several instances in his diary (6 July, 13 July, 18 July) of corps commanders chafing at his "interference". Aylmer Hunter-Weston (GOC VIII Corps) wrote to his wife (3 August) that his staff were glad to be moving to the Second Army at Ypres, that Reserve Army staff had not run smoothly and that although he liked Gough and thought him "a good soldier ... he is hardly a big minded enough man to make a really good Army Commander". Gough also clashed badly with Philip Howell, Chief of Staff of II Corps, who thought Gough "very loveable in many ways", if perhaps not quite sane, and "really quite a child & can be managed like one if treated as such & humoured". By late July and throughout August 1916 Howell complained repeatedly about Army-level micromanagement, with Reserve Army allegedly even taking direct control of four of 12th Division machine guns during an attack on 2 August. Howell claimed (29 August 1916) that Claud Jacob (II Corps), Edward Perceval (49th Division) and even Malcolm (!) were terrified of Gough. Gough thought Howell a "great thorn" who spent much time "trying to argue", avoiding fighting and disobeying orders. Howell was killed by shellfire in September. Gough also clashed with Lord Cavan (XIV Corps) (3 August). Gough's attempts to micro-manage had little effect on the strong-minded Cavan.
Mouquet Farm
Gough ordered further attacks to seize the German OG1 and OG2 trenches north of Pozières, and to take Mouquet Farm (which lies approximately between Pozières and Thiepval). The first attack, by tired troops in the dark, failed. 1st Australian Division were withdrawn on 25 July and replaced by 2nd Australian Division. Gary Sheffield & Daniel Todman argue that Gough's "direct operational control" of 2nd Australian Division on 29 July contributed to the failure of that attack, as Gough pressured Maj-Gen James Gordon Legge to attack before preparations were complete. The German positions were on a reverse slope, so wire and machine gun positions could not be destroyed by bombardment. Charles Bean blamed Legge for not standing up to Gough, and wrote that Brudenell White blamed himself for not doing so, although Sheffield argues that this is not entirely fair, as Legge, a "colonial", should have had more support from Corps level. By the end of July it was clear that the Germans were not about to crumble as Haig had hoped, and on 2 August he ordered Reserve Army to conduct methodical attacks in the area from Pozières to Mouquet Farm and Ovillers, as economically with men and munitions as possible, so as to draw in German reserves and thus assist with Rawlinson's attacks on Gough's right flank. Haig recorded (diary 3 August) that Gough had demanded "reasons in writing" from Legge, after the failure of the Australian attack. Gough had written to William Birdwood (1 ANZAC Corps Commander) demanding an explanation and asking if the attack would have succeeded given "greater energy and foresight on the part of the higher commanders". Birdwood refused to pass this note on to Legge as he thought it was "essential to give (him) a fair trial". Legge's second attack on Mouquet Farm, was better planned and succeeded on 4 August. Gough now planned to capture Thiepval by converging attacks by the ANZACs from the east and by II Corps to the south west. This meant that the ANZACs had to attack along the crest of Thiepval Ridge, facing German fire from west, north and east. These attacks were often small in scale and were often not coordinated with II Corps attacks, let alone with Fourth Army, allowing the Germans – who knew the BEF plan from captured documents – a chance to concentrate their fire on the attackers. Gough almost pushed Maj-Gen Robert Fanshawe (48th Division) (25 August) to the point of resignation. Gough complained to Haig (Haig diary 29 August) that "the Commanders of the Australians are becoming less offensive in spirit! The men are all right...." In over a month of fighting II Corps and I ANZAC Corps advanced 0.5-mile (0.8 km) towards Mouquet Farm and Thiepval. The BEF (not just ANZACs but also the 12th, 25th, 48th divisions and the Canadian Corps) suffered approximately 20,000 casualties in these attacks from 7 August to 12 September. The ANZACs had suffered 23,000 casualties in six weeks, a similar loss to what they had endured in eight months at Gallipoli. Prior & Wilson criticised Gough for his responsibility for what they called "the Mouquet Farm fiasco", not least because at some point in September (documentary evidence of the exact date has not been found) Gough had changed his mind and decided to attack Thiepval solely from the front, rather than trying to outflank it via Mouquet Farm. Philpott believes that although Haig's instructions were "confusing and contradictory", Gough (and Rawlinson) share some responsibility for the costly nature of these small piecemeal attacks, whose supposed aim was to "wear down" the Germans, prior to the decisive breakthrough which Haig was hoping to achieve in September. In August, clearly still hopeful that decisive victory could be attained on the Somme, Gough wrote to one of his nephews: "We are breaking in bit by bit and we must not stop until we have made the gap. It would be terrible to ask our men to begin their attacks all over again on fresh defences next year."
Autumn
===== Initial attack on Thiepval ===== A conference was held on 23 August to plan the attack on Thiepval, and the V Corps Chief of Staff (Brig-Gen Gerald Boyd) later brushed aside the GOC 6th Division's objections that an afternoon attack was unwise. The next day detailed plans for each division's attack were issued not at corps level but by Reserve Army. 3 September saw an attack by four divisions of Reserve Army from Pozières to the Ancre valley, simultaneously with an attack by Fourth Army. V Corps, extending Reserve Army operations into the Ancre valley for the first time, attacked towards St Pierre Divion and Schwaben Redoubt (north of Thiepval) to attack Thiepval from the north. II Corps (48th and 25th Divisions, moved up in mid-August) attacked Thiepval. These attacks failed. 4th Australian Division gained part of Fabeck Graben Redoubt north of Mouquet Farm, which was then lost by the Canadian Corps when it relieved 1 ANZAC Corps in the line. The attack by 39th and 49th divisions (part of II Corps) failed, with some battalions taking between 30% and 50% casualties. Gough attributed the failure to lack of "martial qualities", lack of "discipline and motivation", "ignorance on the part of the Commanding officers" and "poor spirit in the men", to which Claud Jacob, GOC II Corps, added "want of direction", "stage fright", and cowardice on the part of the brigadier, while also commenting adversely on the lack of casualties among the C.O.s. V Corps, at Reserve Army's insistence, sent a detailed critique of the operation to 39th Division. However, Gough took responsibility for not having cancelled the operation when it was clear surprise had been lost. He had lost an ADC wounded next to him as he observed attacks, his third during the war.
===== Assisting Rawlinson's offensive ===== Gough had submitted (28 August) an ambitious plan for the capture of Courcelette on his right flank. This was rejected by Launcelot Kiggell, who told him that he was to continue to conduct limited operations to assist Rawlinson with the Battle of Flers–Courcelette the next Fourth Army attack, which, if successful, would enable Rawlinson to attack Thiepval (on Gough's front) from the rear. In the event Haig changed his mind at the last moment. Two days before Flers–Courcelette, Haig (13 September) – over Rawlinson's objections (Rawlinson diary 14 September) – ordered an attack on Martinpuich (Rawlinson's left flank) and an attack by 2nd and 3rd Canadian divisions on Courcelette (Gough's right flank) with a view to opening a gap which could be exploited by cavalry. Haig also urged Gough and Rawlinson (separately) not to neglect any opportunity to put the cavalry through, the ultimate aim being to take the Germans facing the Third and even First armies (to Gough's north) from the rear. II and V Corps were also to make feint attacks at Thiepval. The Canadian assault on Courcelette was a great success. Gough wrote (to his brother Johnnie's widow Dorothea, 23 September 1916) that many corps and division commanders were "incompetent" and that "considerable exercise of firmness" was needed to get them to obey orders.
Thiepval Ridge
After Flers-Courcelette (15 September), Haig, perhaps believing a decisive breakthrough to be imminent, initially envisaged Gough attacking Thiepval, together with further attacks by Fourth Army and by the French further south – an attack by ten divisions. Gough's plan was for 18th Division to capture Thiepval and Schwaben Redoubt, 11th Division to capture Mouquet Farm and Zollern and Stuff Redoubts (roughly north of Mouquet Farm) while on the right 1st and 2nd Canadian divisions were to attack from Courcelette to Regina Trench which lay just beyond the ridge line. Gough allocated all seven of his tanks (five of which broke down before reaching the lines) to the Canadians. The preliminary bombardment began on 23 September. This was the heaviest barrage yet fired by Reserve Army, assisted by an indirect machine gun barrage into the German rear areas. Gough had 570 field guns and 270 howitzers to attack along a 6,000-yard (5,500 m) front (roughly twice the concentration of 1 July, but only half that of the Battle of Bazentin Ridge on 14 July and much the same as that of the Battle of Flers–Courcelette on 15 September. Allenby's Third Army was to co-operate with an attack on Gough's left flank (Haig diary 24 September 30 September). In the event poor weather delayed the attacks until the early afternoon of 25 September. As Gough planned to use a few tanks to assist his attack, Haig ordered him to delay until the following morning when they could be concealed in the morning mist but in the event further delays, for which the reason is unclear, meant that Gough attacked at 12:35 pm on 26 September, exactly a day after Rawlinson and Foch. Four divisions of Canadian and II Corps attacked between Courcelette and Schwaben. The Battle of Thiepval Ridge was Gough's most ambitious operation to date. The attack of 26 September showed the improvement in British tactics. Mouquet Farm at last fell in the afternoon. On the western sector, lodgements were gained in Zollern, Stuff and Schwaben redoubts and British forces pushed to the edge of St Pierre Divion. Thiepval was surrounded and captured by Ivor Maxse's highly trained 18th Division by 08.30 on 27 September. By 30 September, after fierce hand-to-hand fighting in which the British suffered 12,500 casualties, 5 square miles (13 km2) had been gained, an advance of between 1,000–2,000 yards (910–1,830 m). Regina Trench and parts of Stuff and Schwaben Redoubts remained in German hands. This fighting demonstrated that, either attacking German positions with proper artillery support, or in hand-to-hand fighting in which artillery support mattered little, British volunteer infantry could fight as well as the Germans. The same would prove true in November. Gough's capture of Thiepval (an original objective for 1 July) preserved his status with Commander-in-Chief.
